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On December 13, 2016, Barack Obama signed the 21st Century Cures Act 
(Act) into law.1 Congress designed the Act to expedite the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval process of pharmaceutical and medical device 
applications. Moreover, it intended the Act to increase patient access to 
innovative therapies.2 Nevertheless, some stakeholders fervently contested the 
legislation.3 In particular, many experts claimed that the Act’s Title III provisions 
promoted evidentiary “shortcuts” that could cause the FDA to issue drug and 
device approvals based on insufficient data.4 
In drug clinical trials, Title III allows researchers to use surrogate markers 
and real-world evidence.5 For medical devices, Title III requires the FDA to 
exempt certain Class I and II devices from premarket review.6 Moreover, Title III 
expands the FDA’s obligation to approve all devices based on the least 
burdensome approach.7 As a result, various experts believe that Title III advocates 
a less rigorous evidentiary standard that will erode the reliability and safety of 
FDA approved drugs and devices.8 
This article analyzes the 21st Century Cures Act regarding its origin, 
clinical trial impact, and potential harms. Section II discusses the legislative 
history of the Act.9 Section III explains the factors that caused the legislature to 
propose and adopt the Act.10 Section IV discusses the FDA’s basic drug and 
device approval process.11 Section V analyzes the evidentiary changes that the 
Act makes to medical product development.12 Section VI concludes that the 21st 




1 Joseph A. Goble, The Potential Effect of the 21st Century Cures Act on Drug Development, 
24 J. MANAGED CARE SPECIALTY PHARMACY 677, 677 (2018). See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. 
L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
2 21st Century Cures Act, FDA (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-
information/selected-amendments-fdc-act/21st-century-cures-act. See 21st Century Cures Act, 
Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
3 Goble, supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
5 21st Century Cares Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 3011, § 507, 130 Stat. 1033, 1086 (2016) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 357); 21st Century Cares Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 
3022, § 505F, 130 Stat. 1033, 1096 (2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355g). 
6 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3054, 130 Stat. 1033, 1126 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. § 360). 
7 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3058, 130 Stat. 1033, 1128–129 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. § 360). 
8 Stephen Barlas, 21st Century Cures Bill May Lead to Faster Drug/Device Approvals, 42 
PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 76, 76 (2017); see also Michael Gaybay, 21st Century Cures Act, 52 
HOSP. PHARMACY 264, 264 (2017) (expressing that health professionals are concerned that Title III 
“could result in approvals based upon lower quality data”).  
9 See infra Section II.  
10 See infra Section III.  
11 See infra Section IV. 
12 See infra Section V. 
13 See infra Section VI.  
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II. DEFINING THE 21ST CENTURY CURES ACT 
 
A. Legislative History  
Public Law 114-255,14 known as the 21st Century Cures Act,15 was “one 
of the most-lobbied healthcare bills in recent history.”16 The Bill prompted 400 
organizations to hire more than 1,455 lobbyists,17 and it yielded lobbying 
expenditures of “as much as half a billion dollars.”18 Although the bill’s most 
prominent advocates were pharmaceutical manufactures,19 its activists also 
included universities, medical schools, patient groups, and other related 
organizations.20 By contrast, the Bill’s opponents were public interest groups, 
some liberal Democrats,21 and some healthcare professionals.22  
Supporters alleged that the proposed legislation “would ‘modernize’ the 
FDA[’s] . . . approval process” and accelerate “the delivery of cutting-edge, 
lifesaving medicines to patients.”23 Conversely, opposers argued that the Bill’s 
provisions would weaken the FDA’s review standards and increase the risk of 
 
14 Public laws are regulations that “affect society as a whole.” Federal Register, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/laws (last updated Dec. 28, 2017). Legal 
professionals cite public laws using “the abbreviation, Pub. L., the Congress number (e.g., 107), 
and the number of the law.” Id. 
15 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 1000, 130 Stat. 1033, 1039 (2016) (stating 
that Division A of the act “may be cited as the ‘21st Century Cures Act’”). 
16 Sydney Lupkin, Legislation That Would Shape FDA And NIH Triggers Lobbying Frenzy, 
NPR (Nov. 25, 2016, 6:00 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2016/11/25/503176370/legislation-that-would-shape-fda-and-nih-triggers-lobbying-frenzy.  
17 A lobbyist is an individual “who conducts activities [that are] aimed at influencing or 
swaying public officials and especially members of a legislative body on legislation.” Lobbyist, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/lobbyist (last viewed on Jan 1, 
2020).  
18 Lupkin, supra note 16. 
19 Pharmaceutical companies employed most of the lobbyist that advocated the bill. See Sheila 
Kaplan, Winners and losers of the 21st Century Cures Act, STAT (Dec. 5, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/12/05/21st-century-cures-act-winners-losers/; see Lupkin, supra 
note 16 (stating that AbbVie, a large pharmaceutical manufacture, spent $7.7 million to support 
the bill, and that, Pharmaceutical Researchers of America (PhRMA), the leading pharmaceutical 
industry trade group, dedicated $24.7 million of its $30.3 million total lobbying expenditures to 
champion the bill). 
20 See Lupkin, supra note 16 (stating that “[h]ospitals and medical schools . . . supported the 
bill because the NIH funding could propel grants to medical and research institutions”); see also 
Barlas, supra note 8 (stating that the Advanced Medical Technology Association, the leading 
medical device trade group, supported the bill). 
21 William H. Manz, 21st Century Cures Act: A Legislative History of Public Law No. 114-
255, 1 WILLIAM S. HEIN & CO. INC. i, v (2018). Some public interest groups believed that the bill 
perpetuated “a trend of eroding standards at the Food and Drug Administration since the 1990s.” 
Id. (quoting Michael Carom, a Public Citizen member). 
22 See Robert M. Kaplan, Is the 21st Century Cures Act a Solution or a Problem?, THE REG. 
REV. (May 7, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/05/07/kaplan-21st-century-cures-act/.  
23 Trudy Lieberman, With media watchdogs on the sidelines, pharma-funded advocacy groups 
pushed Cures Act to the finish line, HEALTHNEWSREVIEW.ORG (Dec. 6, 2016), 
https://www.healthnewsreview.org/2016/12/with-media-watchdogs-sidelined-pharma-funded-
advocacy-groups-pushed-cures-act-to-the-finish-line/. Fred Upton, a Republican congressman, 
asserted that the bill was “‘an innovative game-changer and a truly once-in-a-generation 
opportunity to bring . . . [the U.S.] healthcare system light years ahead.” Manz, supra note 21.  
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harm to patients.24 Many critics voiced “overarching concerns . . . that” 
pharmaceutical and medical device manufactures were “hijack[ing]”25 the FDA’s 
duty to “ensur[e] the safety, efficacy, and security”26 of new medical products.27 
Some of the Act’s challengers even likened portions of the law to “legalize[d] 
fraud” that “undercut[] the development of real cures.”28 
Despite its controversy, the Bill generated widespread bipartisan support,29 
and President Barack Obama signed the 21st Century Cures Act into law on 
December 13, 2016.30 Because the FDA is in the early stages of implementing the 
Act’s requirements,31 its impact on clinical trials, medical products, and patients 
are mostly unknown. As a result, it is imperative that regulators and the medical 
 
24 See Kaplan, supra note 22.  
25 Reshma Ramachandran & Zachary Berger, 21st Century Cures Act will distort the meaning 
of ‘FDA approved’, STAT (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/12/01/21st-century-
cures-act-fda-approval/.  
26 What We Do: FDA Mission, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/what-we-do (last updated 
Mar. 28, 2018).  
27 Ramachandran & Berger, supra note 25. Strong financial incentives likely drove the 
pharmaceutical and medical device industry to heavily lobby for the 21st Century Act. See 
Michelle Llamas, 21st Century Cures Act Benefits Big Pharma, Device Makers, Critics Say, 
DRUGWATCH (Dec. 8, 2016). https://www.drugwatch.com/news/2016/12/08/21st-century-cures-
act-benefits-big-pharma/ (noting that the proposed legislation would save pharmaceutical and 
medical device manufactures “billions [of dollars] to bring new drugs and devices to market”). 
28 Manz, supra note 21, at vi (quoting Senator Elizabeth Warren); see Elizabeth Warren, 
delivering remarks on the 21st Century Cures Act (Nov. 28, 2016) (transcript available at 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senator-warren-delivers-remarks-on-the-
proposed-21st-century-cures-bill). Senator Elizabeth Warren and other opponents expressed strong 
disapproval about the portions of the Act that set less rigorous FDA approval standards, such as its 
provision that allows the FDA to approve the secondary use of a previously approved drug without 
requiring the manufacturer to “conduct[] a randomized clinical trial.” Id.  
29 Manz, supra note 21.  
30 Goble, supra note 1. The Energy and Commerce Committee, one of the oldest committees 
of the U.S. House of Representatives, introduced the initial draft of the 21st Century Cures Act as 
the “21st Century Cures Initiative” in April 2014. About E&C, HOUSE COMMITTEE ENERGY COM., 
https://energycommerce.house.gov/about-ec (last viewed Mar. 5, 2020); Kirsten Messmer & 
Robert Cumming, 21st Century Cures Act Innovation Breakthroughs, and Research in Under-
Represented Populations, THE EVIDENCE FORUM 1 (Nov. 2017), https://www.evidera.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/02-21st-Century-Cures-Act-Innovation-Breakthroughs-and-
Research_2017Nov.pdf. Over a two-year period, the House of Representatives and the Senate 
negotiated a “bipartisan agreement to fund and accelerate cancer research and overall medical 
product discovery, development, and delivery (Division A, the 21st Century Cures Act); to help 
families in mental health crisis (Division B); and, to increase the choice, access, and quality in 
healthcare for Americans (Division C).” Messmer & Cumming, supra. Ultimately, the House and 
Senate voted in favor of the Act 392-26 and 94-5, respectively. Barlas, supra note 8.  
31 The 21st Century Act approves government funding to implement its provisions over a 10-
year period. Margaret Rouse, 21st Century Cures Act, TECHTARGET, 
https://searchhealthit.techtarget.com/definition/21st-Century-Cures-Act (last updated Feb. 2018); 
see 21st Century Cures Act, supra note 2 (discussing the FDA’s 9-year work and implementation 
plan for the Act); see also 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, §§ 1001–02, 130 Stat. 
1033, 1040 (2016).  
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community reevaluate whether the Act will eviscerate the FDA approval process 
and disseminate harmful medical products to patients.32  
 
B. The Provisions & Purpose 
The legislature designed the 21st Century Cures Act to expedite the 
FDA’s approval of pharmaceutical and medical device applications, and it 
intended the Act to increase patient access to innovative therapies.33 The Act 
contains the following three divisions: Division A (21st Century Cures Act)34; 
 
32 See Kaplan, supra note 22 (stating that the FDA developed “high standards” due to “terrible 
disasters such as thalidomide, diethylstilbestrol, and the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device[,]” and 
“the 21st Century Cures Act is deserving of . . . continu[ed] scrutiny” because it “lowers 
standards”).  
33 21st Century Cures Act, supra note 2. Congress defined the 21st Century Cures Act as a 
vehicle “[t]o accelerate the discovery, development, and delivery of 21st century cures, and for 
other purposes.” 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat 1033 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (stating that the “short title” of Public Law 114-255 
“may be cited as the ‘21st Century Cures Act’”); see Covington & Burling LLP, 21st Century 
Cures Act: Key Provisions (Title III - Development), COVINGTON 1 (Dec. 22, 206), 
https://www.cov.com/-
/media/files/corporate/publications/2016/12/21st_century_cures_act_key_provisions_title_iii_dev
elopment.pdf (stating that “[t]he Act amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(“‘FDCA’”) and Public Health Service Act (“‘PHSA’”), among other laws, with the aim of 
accelerating the discovery, development, and delivery of new medicines and medical 
technologies”). The Act authorizes government spending of more than $6.3 billion on medical 
research and development initiatives. Lisa Wesel, $6.3 Billion Approved for 21st Century Cures 
Act, TRADELINE (Jan 1, 2017), https://www.tradelineinc.com/reports/2017-1/63-billion-
approved-21st-century-cures-act. More specifically, the Act provides the FDA $500 million to 
help it streamline its approval process. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 1002, 
130 Stat 1033, 1042 (2016); see also Wesel, supra.  Moreover, the Act grants the National 
Institute of Health (NIH) $4.8 billion to increase its grant distribution to research organizations. 
See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 1001, 130 Stat 1033, 1039 (2016); see also 
Wesel, supra. The NIH is “the nation’s medical research agency,” and it is a part of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services. Who We Are, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, 
https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are (last viewed on Oct. 20, 2019). The NIH “invests 
nearly $41.7 billion annually in medical research for the American people,” and it distributes its 
funds to “more than 300,000 researchers at more than 2,500 . . . research institutions in every 
state.” What We Do, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/budget 
(last updated June 29, 2020). 
34 Division A of the 21st Century Cures Act “provides funding for biomedical research—
including the Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI) and the Cancer Moonshot Initiative—and for the 
opioid crisis response; modifies Food and Drug Administration (FDA) pathways for the approval 
of regulated medical products; and makes a number of reforms to the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH).” Amanda K. Sarata, The 21st Century Cures Act (Division A of P.L. 114-255), CONG. RES. 
SERV. 1 (Dec. 23, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44720.pdf. To support biomedical research, 
Division A granted the Precision Medicine Initiative, or the All of Us Program, $1.455 billion “to 
gather data from ≥1 million people living in the United States to accelerate research and improve 
health by accounting for individual variations in lifestyle, environment, and biology.” Larry B. 
Goldstein, Twenty-First Century Cures Act Semper Vigilans, 49 STROKE 2555, 2555 (2018). In 
addition, Division A granted the Cancer Moonshot Initiative $1.800 billion to prevent, detect, and 
“make more therapies available to more patients . . . .” Id. 
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Division B (Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis) 35; and Division C36 
(Increasing Choice, Access, and Quality in Health Care for Americans).37  
Most experts agree that the Act’s funding provisions are beneficial 
because they advance innovative research and mental health initiatives.38 
Nevertheless, numerous experts disagree about the aptness of the Act’s other 
provisions.39  
Most notably, Title III of Division A appears to be “the most controversial 
section of the Cures Act.”40 The Title III provisions “modernize regulations for 
new drug and device development . . . to streamline the . . . [FDA’s] review of 
applications in a more ‘industry-friendly’ manner.”41 Some experts warn that the 
 
35 Division B of the 21st Century Cures Act aids the “prevention, treatment, and recovery” of 
mental illness and substance abuse. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, Div. B, 130 
Stat. 1033, 1202 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). In relation, Division B 
addressed issues related to support initiatives, health care access, Medicaid Mental Health 
Coverage, HIPPA regulations, and the justice system. Id.  
36 Division C of the 21st Century Act addresses Medicare Part A, Medicare Part B, other 
Medicare provisions, and small employer health plan requirements. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. 
L. No. 114-255, Div. C, 130 Stat. 1033, 1315 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
37 Sarata, supra note 34. See Goldstein, supra note 34 (stating that the 311-page bill is 
composed of 3 divisions . . . 18 titles, and 23 subtitles).  
38 Messmer & Cumming, supra note 30; see Ramachandran and Berger, supra note 25 
(stating that “[t]he legislation does include some redeeming features, such as increases in funding 
for the National institutes [sic] of Health and for addressing mental health and the opioid 
epidemic”); see also Goldstein, supra note 34 (stating that “[m]ultiple sections of the 21st Century 
Cures Act were causes for celebration,” such as “funding for National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
Innovations projects”). But not all experts agree that the Act’s funding provisions are beneficial. 
See Goble, supra note 1. Because the provisions transfer $3.5 million of the Prevention and Public 
Health Fund’s (PPHF) funding to the NIH, some experts believe that the provisions will impair the 
PPHF’s “substantial” and “far reaching” work. Id. 
39 See Goble, supra note 1 (stating that the Act’s controversial provisions “may lead to . . . 
serious unintended consequences”); see also Jessica K. Cohen, 21st Century Cures Act driving 
FDA changes, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Sept. 7, 2019), 
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/politics-policy/21st-century-cures-act-driving-fda-changes 
(explaining that the central dispute about the Act is “[w]hether getting potentially life-saving 
treatments into the hands of patients is worth [the] possible safety risks associated with approving 
them more quickly”).  
40 See Goble, supra note 1 (stating that “there is much controversy over” some of the Title III 
provisions because they “potentially diminish the robustness of the evidence base required for 
drug and medical device approvals”). See also Goldstein, supra note 34, at 2556 (stating that Title 
III of Division A “are among the law’s more controversial provisions”).  
41 Goble, supra note 1. Title III intends to advance medical product development through its 
“Subtitle A – Patient Focused Drug Development,” “Subtitle B – Modern Trial Design and 
Evidence Development,” “Subtitle – D Patient Access to Therapies and Information,” “Subtitle – 
E Antimicrobial Innovation and Stewardship,” “Subtitle – F Medical Device Innovations,” and 
“Subtitle – G Improving Scientific Expertise and Outreach at the FDA.” Proposed FDA Work 
Plan for 21st Century Cures Act Innovation Account Activities, FDA 13, 
https://www.fda.gov/media/104756/download (last viewed Mar. 5, 2019). For the drug 
development process, the most debated Title III provisions involve the “use of surrogate endpoints 
in clinical trials, modernization of clinical trial design, and use of real-world evidence for decision 
making.” Goble, supra note 1. 
40-2 JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDICIARY  
 
85
Title III provisions introduce evidentiary “shortcuts” that may cause the FDA to 
issue drug and medical device approvals based on insufficient data.42 
While many experts acknowledge that “expedited access to truly effective 
drugs may confer net benefits under these regulatory conditions,” Title III’s weak 
evidentiary requirements may lead to unexpected harms.43 Thus, regulators and 
other stakeholders carefully evaluate the impact of certain Title III provisions.44 
 
III. FACTORS THAT PAVED THE WAY FOR THE ACT 
It is vital to consider the factors that caused the legislature to create Title 
III to understand and evaluate its provisions. This section examines the factors 
that likely prompted the legislature to enact Title III. The relevant factors 
presumably were high research and development costs, burdensome medical 
device approvals, and lengthy drug approvals. 
 
A. High Research and Development (R&D) Costs 
Historically, medical product manufacturers paid high costs to fund their 
research and development (R&D) activities. The substantial R&D payouts 
diminished medical product manufacturers’ return on investment45 and their 
capacity to research new products.46  
In the pharmaceutical industry, drug R&D costs rose rapidly each year.47 
In 2003, it cost pharmaceutical manufacturers an average of $1 billion to develop 
a single drug, including the cost of drug failures.48 However, by 2013, the cost to 
 
42 Goble, supra note 1. 
43 Id. (footnotes omitted). See Goldstein, supra note 34, at 2556 (cautioning that a “less 
rigorous evaluation of new putative therapies could lead to the introduction of ineffective or 
hazardous treatment approaches”).1 
44 See Goble, supra note 1 (stating “[w]hile many of the evidence evaluation provisions will 
take several years to implement, careful consideration must be given regarding the future of 
disease management in the United States”). 
45 “Return on investment (ROI) is a performance measure used to evaluate the efficiency of an 
investment” based on its costs. James Chen, Return on Investment (ROI), INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/returnoninvestment.asp (last updated Apr. 27, 2020). To 
calculate ROI, use the following equation: ROI=
Current Value of the Investment-Cost of Investment
Cost of Investment
. Id. 
46 See Kenyon Farrow, The 21st Century Cures Act’s “Pathway to Crisis” in Drug Safety, 
TAGLINE 4 (Oct. 2015), https://www.treatmentactiongroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/tagline-2015-October-Final.pdf (explaining that shareholders are placing 
“greater pressure” on pharmaceutical manufacturers to “reduc[e] R&D costs” because it will allow 
“more drugs to [go to] market” and “boost company profits”).  
47 2015 profile BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY, PHRMA 65 (Apr. 2015), 
http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015_phrma_profile.pdf.  
48 Thomas Sullivan, A Tough Road: Cost To Develop One New Drug Is $2.6 Billion; 
Approval Rate for Drugs Entering Clinical Development is Less Than 12%, POL’Y & MED., 
https://www.policymed.com/2014/12/a-tough-road-cost-to-develop-one-new-drug-is-26-billion-
approval-rate-for-drugs-entering-clinical-de.html (last updated Mar. 21, 2019). See 2015 profile 
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY, supra note 47. The average cost to develop 
one drug, including the cost of drug failures, was $179 million in the 1970s, $413 million in the 
1980s, and $1.0 billion in the early 2000s. Id. at 35. Regarding drug failures, only 12% of 
compounds would progress to Phase I of a clinical trial. Id. Moreover, even where the FDA 
approved a drug, only 2 out of 10 marketed drugs yielded revenue returns that equaled or 
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develop a drug rose to an average of $2.6 billion.49 Correspondingly, in 2014, 
PhRMA50 members spent a total aggregate of approximately $51.2 billion on 
R&D,51 and their U.S. R&D expense comprised 23.4% of their U.S. sales.52 
According to Joseph A. DiMasi, the director of economic analysis at the Tufts 
Center for the Study of Drug Development, the rising R&D cost were primarily 
due to “increases in out-of-pocket costs for individual drugs and higher failure 
rates for drugs tested in human subjects.”53  
Like pharmaceutical manufacturers, medical device manufacturers paid 
costly R&D expenses.54 In 2012, the top 100 medical device companies spent 
over $540 million on average for their R&D activities.55 Moreover, many medical 
device manufacturers increased their R&D budget each year.56 Between 2010 and 
 
exceeded their R&D costs. Id. at KEYFACTS 2015. Thus, approximately eighty percent of a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer’s marketed drugs returned little to no profits. 
49 The $2.6 billion figure included an “approximate average out-of-pocket cost of $1.4 
billion” and an opportunity cost of $1.2 billion to bring a drug to market. Sullivan, supra note 48; 
see Sammy Almashat, Pharmaceutical Research Cost: The Myth of the $2.6 Billion Pill, 
PUBLICCITIZEN (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.citizen.org/news/pharmaceutical-research-costs-
the-myth-of-the-2-6-billion-pill/ (explaining that the $2.6 billion average represented a 
manufacture’s actual cost of $1.4 billion to develop a drug and its opportunity cost of $1.2 billion 
to “forg[o] investments with annual returns of 10.5%”); see also Richard Harris, R&D Costs For 
Cancer Drugs Are Likely Much Less Than Industry Claims, Study Finds, NPR (Sept. 11, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/09/11/550135932/r-d-costs-for-cancer-drugs-are-
likely-much-less-than-industry-claims-study-finds (discussing how some consumer advocacy 
groups believed that it cost pharmaceutical manufacturers significantly less than $2.6 billion to 
develop a drug, but industry participants strongly disagreed with the consumer groups because the 
heightened cost of drug failures drastically raised the cost of drug R&D activities). According to 
experts, it cost drug manufacturers an additional $312 million to perform post-approval R&D, 
meaning that the total R&D cost of each approved drug was around $3 billion. Sullivan, supra 
note 48. 
50 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) is a trade group that 
“represents the country’s leading innovative biopharmaceutical research companies.” About, 
PHRMA, https://www.phrma.org/About (last viewed Mar. 5, 2020).   
51 2015 profile BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY, supra note 47. As a group, 
PhRMA members spent $41.1 billion in the United States and $10.1 billion abroad on R&D in 
2014. Id. Between 2010 and 2014, PhRMA members collectively spent over two hundred billion 
dollars on R&D investments in the U.S. and abroad. Id.  
52 Id. at 66. According to PhRMA, “[t]he pharmaceutical industry is one of the most research-
intensive industries in the United States,” and “[p]harmaceutical firms invest as much as five times 
more in research and development, relative to their sales, than the average US manufacturing 
firm.” Id. at 36 (citing Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (Oct. 2006), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-drugr-d.pdf). As a 
collective, PhRMA members’ overall R&D expense totaled $1.9 billion in 1980, $8.4 billion in 
1990, $26.0 billion in 2000, and $50.7 billion in 2010. Id. 
53 Sullivan, supra note 48. DiMasi explained that “increased clinical trial complexity, larger 
clinical trial sizes, higher cost of inputs . . . greater focus on . . . chronic and degenerative diseases, 
changes in protocol design . . . and testing on comparator drugs,” likely led to rising put-of-pocket 
costs. Id.  
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2011, St. Jude Medical, Coviden, and Stryker spent an additional $74 million, 
$107 million, and $68 million on their R&D investments respectively.57  
It is reasonable to conclude that high R&D costs can limit pharmaceutical 
and medical device manufacturers’ financial resources and innovation. 
Fortunately, Title III accelerates medical product development, and it leads to 
lower R&D costs.58 Arguably, the lower R&D costs could benefit public health 
because it could lead to more innovative products. However, stakeholders must 
consider whether a shorter R&D process could compromise the quality of medical 
products and risk the welfare of patients.  
 
B. Burdensome Medical Device Approval Process  
Before the 21st Century Cures Act, medical device approval was time-
consuming and costly. It took medical device manufacturers an average of three 
to seven years to bring “new medical devices from concept to market.”59 
Moreover, it cost manufacturers $32 million on average to “develop[] and get[] a 
medical device to market.”60 Unsurprisingly, most of the cost was related to the 
FDA’s approval requirements.61 According to experts, some medical devices 
generated higher costs than others.62 A study revealed that the FDA took 7.2 
 
57 Id. 
58 See 21st Century Cures Act, supra note 2 (noting that the legislature intended the Act to 
accelerate the discovery, development, and approval stages of R&D); see also Scott Gottlieb, 
Implementation of the 21st Century Cures Act: Progress and the Path Forward for Medical 
Innovation, FDA (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/congressional-
testimony/implementation-21st-century-cures-act-progress-and-path-forward-medical-innovation-
12062017-12062017 (explaining that Title III allowed the FDA to exempt numerous medical 
devices from its 510(k) review pathway as “to decrease regulatory burdens . . . and reduce the 
costs of innovation”).  
59 Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 2: An Overview of Approval 
Processes: FDA Approval of Medical Devices, 1 JACC: BASIC TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 277, 277 
(2016). The average time to bring a medical device to market spans the manufacturer’s conception 
of the device to the FDA’s approval for the manufacturer to market the device. Id.  
60 See Richard Williams, Maze of FDA Regulations Slows Medical Innovation to a Crawl, 
MERCATUS CTR. (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulation/maze-fda-
regulations-slows-medical-innovation-crawl (stating that manufacturers paid $24 million on 
average “to deal with the FDA’s requirements,” and the $24 million constituted “75 percent of the 
overall cost” to bring a device to the market). 
61 Id. User fees are one of the FDA’s various approval requirements. Medical Device User 
Fee Amendments (MDUFA), FDA, https://www.fda.gov/industry/fda-user-fee-programs/medical-
device-user-fee-amendments-mdufa (last updated Aug. 4, 2020). The Center for Devices and 
Radiological Health (CDRH), an FDA subsidiary, performs the premarket review of most medical 
devices. Judith A. Johnson, FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE 1, 1 (Sept. 14, 2016) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42130.pdf. “[C]ongressional 
appropriations and user fees collected from device manufacturers” fund the CDRH’s operations. 
Id. A standard user fee can cost $4,603 to $340,995 per medical device application depending on 
the application type. Medical Device User Fee Amendments (MDUFA), supra. In 2016, the FDA 
collected $134 million in medical device use fees. HHS FY 2016 Budget in Brief – FDA, DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. https://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/budget-in-brief/fda/index.html (last 
updated Feb. 13, 2015). The fees constituted approximately 30% of its medical device fiscal year 
budget. Id. 
62 Michael Blanding, New Medical Devices Get To Patients Too Slowly, HARV. BUS. SCH. 
(Aug. 10, 2015),https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/new-medical-devices-get-to-patients- 
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months longer to approve some “first mover” devices compared to “follow-on” 
devices, and the delay added $6.7 million to these manufacturers’ costs.63 Many 
experts claimed that the FDA had an “obsolete regulatory framework” that made 
the medical device approval process “slow, expensive, [and] uncertain.”64  
As a remedy, Title III requires the FDA to use the “least burdensome” 
evidentiary standards to simplify the medical device approval process.65 
Conceivably, less onerous evidentiary standards could accelerate approval times, 
reduce development costs, and incentivize medical device development.  
However, a closer analysis cautions against the FDA using lower 
evidentiary standards for medical device approvals. Even before the Act, the FDA 
used minimalistic criteria66 to approve medical devices. Therefore, the Act’s 
lower review standards could lead to poor quality assurance and more dangerous 
products.  
 
C. Long Drug Approval Process  
In the past, a potential new medicine underwent a “lengthy, complicated, 
multistep process” that “continue[d] even after” it received FDA approval.67 As a 
result, drug manufacturers spent more than 10 years to develop a new drug,68 
increasing their development costs and limiting their ability to pursue new 




63 Id. According to a study, novel high-risk devices “in any given category . . . took on 
average 34 percent longer to be approved than the next device in that category.” Id.  
64 Williams, supra note 60. Due to the unique features of different medical devices, “including 
how they work, how they are applied to the patient, and how their effectiveness is measured,” the 
FDA spent a significant amount of time creating testing criteria for “each new device.” Blanding, 
supra note 62. Moreover, the FDA had administrative tasks that slowed its review of medical 
devices. Stephen Barlas, Critics Assail FDA Medical Device Approval Process, 36 P&T 395, 395 
(2011). Because the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 “required the FDA to categorize all 
medical devices into Class I, II, or III” designations, the FDA struggled to classify and reapprove 
140 “‘pre-amendment’ devices.” Id. Similarly, the FDA struggled to approve some recent products 
in a timely manner. See Williams, supra note 60 (stating that the FDA did not approve three 
devices that were submitted in 1998 until 2007); see also Blanding, supra note 62 (noting that the 
FDA approved the Edwards Lifescience’s transcatheter heart valve four years after the European 
Union approved the device, making the United States “the 40th country to do so”).  
65 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 3058, § 513, 130 Stat. 1033, 1128–29 
(2016) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. 360). 
66 See infra Section III. 
67 2015 profile BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 37. 
68 Id. at 35. The time to develop a drug spans from when the drug is “identified to when it 
receive[d] approval from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA).” Id. Similarly, an article 
reported that the average time “from preclinical testing in animal models to approval of a new 
drug in the United States takes 12 to 16 years.” Goldstein, supra note 34, at 2556. Furthermore, 
PhRMA reported that clinical research was becoming more complex due to clinical trial 
regulations increasing patient enrollment criteria, the number of “site visits and procedures,” the 
length of clinical trials, and the quantity of data collection. 2015 profile BIOPHARMACEUTICAL 
RESEARCH INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 42. With respect to increased data collection, the form 
that researchers use to collect data “expanded in length by 227% between 2000 and 2011, 
reflecting the growing challenges of conducting clinical trials.” Id. 
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In response, Title III requires the FDA to accept drug applications based 
on surrogate markers69 and real-world evidence,70 as opposed to conventional 
RCT evidence.71 Plausibly, surrogate markers and real-world evidence could 
hasten the approval process because their evidentiary burdens are less rigorous 
and time-consuming compared to RCT evidence.72   
Nevertheless, non-RCT evidence could erode the reliability of a drug’s 
clinical trial data.73 Traditionally, the robust drug development process74 has 
required RCT evidence because it is more scientifically stringent, and it 
safeguards the integrity of clinical data.75 Because alternative evidentiary 
standards could be less reliable, surrogate markers or real-world evidence could 
force the FDA to make its drug approvals based on inaccurate clinical data. 
 
IV. FDA APPROVAL PROCESS AND PRIOR EVIDENTIARY 
STANDARDS 
 
A. Medical Device Approval  
1. Medical Device Classification 
Unlike new pharmaceuticals, not all new medical devices have received 
clinical testing.76 Instead, the FDA has used a risk classification scheme to 
determine whether a medical device requires clinical testing.77 The FDA has 
 
69 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 3011, § 507, 130 Stat. 1033, 1086–91 
(2016) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. 357).   
70 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 3022, § 505F, 130 Stat. 1033, 1096–98 
(2016) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. 355(g)).  
71 RCT refers to a randomized control trial (RCT). See Ted J. Kaptchuk, The double-blind, 
randomized, placebo-controlled trial, 54 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 541, 541 (2001) (stating that 
RCTs are the golden standard of scientific evidence because it protects against biased data). 
72 See Matthew Herper, Attempt to replicate clinical trials with real-world data generates 
real-world criticism, too, STAT (July 3, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/07/03/replicate-
clinical-trials-real-world-evidence/ (explaining that a researcher replicated the results of a RCT 
trial using real-world “data from insurance databases to monitor a heart drug’s safety,” and it “cut 
the time to get data in half – at a considerably lower cost” compared to the RCT); see also 21st 
Century Cures Act, supra note 2 (noting that the legislature designed the Act to accelerate the 
discovery, development, and approval stages of R&D). 
73 According to one expert, non-RCT evidence is not “useless as a hypothesis-generating 
approach” but “’it is certainly not something that ought to be used for regulatory decisions’” or 
“clinical decisions.” Matthew Herper, supra note 72 (quoting Dr. Steven Nissen, a leading 
cardiologist at the Cleveland Clinic). Similarly, another expert cautioned that non-RCT evidence 
is more prone to bias, and he considered it risky to “to supplant [RCT evidence because it] . . . has 
really generated huge amounts of important data.” Id. (quoting Dr. David Nathan, the director of 
the Diabetes Center and Clinical Research Center at Massachusetts General Hospital). 
74 See infra Section III. 
75 Kaptchuk, supra note 71. 
76 Considerations for the Design and Execution of Medical Device Trials, PREMIER RES. (July 
3, 2018), https://premier-research.com/blog/perspectivesmedical-devices-vs-drug-trials/. 
77 Id. 
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categorized medical devices into Class I,78 II,79 and III80 designations.81 The class 
type has “define[d] the regulatory requirements,” and the “[r]egulatory control 
 
78 Class I devices represent low-risk products. US FDA Medical Device Classification, 
EMERGO, https://www.emergobyul.com/services/united-states/fda-device-classification (last 
viewed Mar. 5, 2020). The FDA refers to Class I requirements as “general controls.” Id. Class I 
devices include simple products, such as “adhesive bandages, scalpels, and manual stethoscopes.” 
Id. The FDA alleges that Class I products “must be suitable for their intended use, be adequately 
packaged and properly labeled, and be manufactured under a “‘quality system,’” but some experts 
contend that Class I oversight is minimal and functions more like a “‘self-registration process.’” 
Why ‘Approved’ Medical Devices in the U.S. May Not Be Safe or Effective, 
HEALTHNEWSREVIEW.ORG https://www.healthnewsreview.org/toolkit/tips-for-
understanding-studies/medical-devices/ (last viewed Mar. 5, 2020). The FDA allows a 
manufacture to register most Class I devices without FDA clearance. US FDA Medical Device 
Classification, supra. According to the FDA, “35% of medical device types are Class I[,] and . . . 
93% of these are exempt from pre-market review.” Bennett Napier, FDA and Dental Products, 




79 Class II devices represent medium-risk products, and the FDA refers to Class II 
requirements as “special controls.” US FDA Medical Device Classification, supra note 78. Class II 
devices are more complex devices, such as “endoscopes, powered wheelchairs, syringes, and total 
joint implants,” and their misuse or malfunction may cause medium harm. Id. According to the 
FDA, “53% of device types” are Class II devices, and “[m]ost require FDA review through 
premarket notification (510(k)).” Are Medical Device Manufacturers Risking Your Safety?, 
WATER KRAUS & PAUL (May 16, 2019), https://www.waterskraus.com/medical-device-
manufacturers-risking-safety/; see US FDA Medical Device Classification, supra note 78 (stating 
that “[s]ome Class II devices only need to be registered, but many require [FDA] clearance”). A 
510(k) clearance, or a Premarket Notification (PMN), refers to Section 510(k) of the FDCA, and it 
allows the FDA to clear a device without any “evidence of [its] safety or efficacy” where a 
manufacturer claims that its device is “‘substantially equivalent’” to an existing device on the 
market. Why ‘Approved’ Medical Devices in the U.S. May Not Be Safe or Effective, supra note 78.  
80 Class III devices represent high-risk products, and the FDA explains that “[t]hese devices 
usually sustain or support life, are implanted, or present potential high risk of illness or injury.” 
Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared by FDA for Marketing, FDA (Dec. 29, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/consumers-medical-devices/learn-if-medical-device-has-
been-cleared-fda-marketing. Class III devices are sophisticated devices, such as “implantable 
pacemakers and breast implants.” Id. Only nine percent of all devices are Class III, and the FDA 
must review the devices “through [the] premarket approval (PMA) or humanitarian device 
exemption (HDE)” pathway. Are Medical Device Manufacturers Risking Your Safety?, supra note 
79. 
81 Overview of Device Regulation, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-advice-
comprehensive-regulatory-assistance/overview-device-regulation (last viewed Mar. 5, 2020). 
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[has] increase[d] from Class I to Class III.”82 In the United States, the FDA only 
has required Class III devices83 to undergo clinical testing.84  
As a result, the FDA has not subjected a significant number of medical 
devices to rigorous review.85 Before Title III, the FDA exempted “[a]round three-
fourths of Class I devices, and a small percent of Class II devices” from “safety . . 
. efficacy, . . . [and] clinical trial” testing.86 Moreover, where the FDA did not 
exempt Class I or II devices, it often approved the products based on weak 
clinical evidence.87 As a result, the FDA only restricted its “most stringent” 
approval process to all Class III devices.88 But even many Class III devices 
escaped thorough review because they were pre-amendment devices89 or other 
devices that had a “less rigorous” approval process.90  
 
82 Id.  
83 Before 1976, medical devices were predominately unregulated “and the vast majority were 
not subject to any premarket review.” Jonas Z. Hines el. al., Left to Their Own Devices: 
Breakdowns in United States Medical Device Premarket Review, 7 PLOS MED. 1, 1 (2010); see 
Benjamin N. Rome et. al., Approval of High-Risk Medical Devices in the US: Implications for 
Clinical Cardiology, 16 CURRENT CARDIOLOGY REP. 489, 491 (2014) (explaining that “medical 
devices had no official premarket requirements and were subject to state-level oversight via 
consumer-protection statutes” before the MDA). Congress passed the Medical Device 
Amendments (MDA) of 1976 “to prevent the distribution of dangerous and ineffective devices by 
creating a . . . premarket review mechanism.” Hines et. al., supra. The MDA required the FDA to 
classify devices according to their risk and to use premarket approval (PMA) for the most 
dangerous devices. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 470 (1996). Despite Class III devices 
representing the highest risk, many Class III devices did not receive PMA. Medtronic, Inc., 518 
U.S. at 470. Before the MDA, medical device manufacturers placed over 1,700 kinds of devices 
into commercial distribution, and it was unreasonable for the manufacturers to withdraw the 
devices from the market. Hines et. al., supra at 5. As a result, Congress “allow[ed] pre-1976 
devices to remain on the market without FDA approval until the requisite . . . [review was] 
completed.” Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 470. Thus, around 140 pre-amendment devices remained 
on the market until the FDA “finalized a rule calling for a PMA application for that type of 
device.” Hines et. al., supra at 5. The MDA also allowed devices that were “‘substantially 
equivalent’ to preexisting [Class III] devices to avoid the PMA process until the FDA initiated the 
[review] process for the underlying device.” Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 470; see 515 Program 
Initiative, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/cdrh-transparency/515-program-initiative (last 
updated Dec. 19, 2017) (acknowledging that the “FDA regulated over 170 Class III device types 
through the 510(k) program” after the MDA). Although all Class III devices would eventually 
receive PMA, the FDA failed to publish a CFR to establish a PMA requirement for numerous 
Class III devices over the decades. 515 Program Initiative, supra. In 2019, three percent of pre-
amendment devices remained unclassified as Class I, II, or III altogether. Are Medical Device 
Manufacturers Risking Your Safety?, supra note 79. Consequently, numerous Class III devices on 
the market lacked PMA. Id. 
84 Rome et. al., supra note 83; see Norman, supra note 59, at 278 (stating that “Class I and II 
devices” have a “less stringent regulatory processes than Class III devices”).  
85 Norman, supra note 59, at 278. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Are Medical Device Manufacturers Risking Your Safety?, supra note 79. The most rigorous 
medical device approvals require clinical trials. Norman, supra note 59, at 278. 
89 See, supra note 83. 
90 Norman, supra note 59, at 278. Where a Class III device had a predicate, it could “generally 
be approved by [a] less rigorous . . . process.” Id. A predicate referred to a device that had “only 
minor” differences compared to a new device. Id. Where a new medical device did not have a 
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Regulators and stakeholders must examine the FDA’s prior review standards 
to meaningfully evaluate the changes that Title III has made to medical device 
approvals. This section provides a comprehensive overview of the FDA’s 
approval process leading up to Title III. For non-exempt devices, the basic 
approval applications were the 510(k) Premarket Notification (PMN) Pathway, 
Humanitarian Device Exemption (HDE) Pathway, or Premarket Approval (PMA) 
Pathway.91  
2. 510(k) Premarket Notification (PMN) 
Premarket Notification (PMN) was an expedited clearance92 pathway that 
required its applicants to “show[] that [their] device [was] substantially 
equivalent93 to an existing device that . . . already” received FDA clearance or 
approval.94 Where the FDA determined that a PMN device was substantially 
equivalent to its predicate, it cleared the device for commercial distribution.95  
Although PMN featured mostly moderate risk and some high-risk 
devices,96 the FDA typically did not require the devices to demonstrate “direct 
 
predicate, it received a Class III designation automatically. Id. Nevertheless, an applicant could 
ask the FDA to reclassify a new device to Class I or II. Id. If the FDA reclassified a Class III 
device, it called the device a de novo device. Id. Like Class III devices that had a predicate, the 
FDA subjected de novo devices to “a less rigorous [review] process.” Id. 
91 Id. 
92 According to the FDA, a manufacturer had to have the FDA clear or approve their device to 
legally market or sell it in the United States “unless it [was] . . . exempt.” See Premarket 
Notification 510(k), supra note 95. FDA clearance referred to PMN devices that the FDA 
considered “substantially equivalen[t] to another legally U.S. marketed device.” Id. By contrast, 
FDA approval referred to PMA or HDE devices that the FDA found to have met particular safety 
or efficacy standards. Tom Rish, How FDA Distinguishes Between Clearance vs. Approval vs. 
Granted, GREENLIGHT GURU (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.greenlight.guru/blog/fda-clearance-
approval-granted#:~:text=Clearance%3A%20When%20a%20medical%20device,rigorous%20revi
ew%20and%20approval%20process.&text=This%20is%20a%20relatively%20new%20term%20i
n%20the%20FDA%20lexicon. See PMA Approvals, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medical-
devices/device-approvals-denials-and-clearances/pma-approvals (last updated Aug. 24, 2018); see 
also HDE Approvals, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-approvals-denials-and-
clearances/hde-approvals (last updated Aug. 24. 2018).  
93 A new device was substantially equivalent to a predicate device if “[i]t [had] the same 
intended use as the predicate device,” and it either had “the same technological characteristics” or 
the same safety and efficacy profile as the predicate device. Elaine Silvestrini, FDA 510(k) 
Clearance – Dangerous Fast-Track Approval Process, https://www.drugwatch.com/fda/510k-
clearance/ (last updated May 14, 2019). 
94 Norman, supra note 59, at 280 (explaining that PMN was “a fast-track process for devices” 
that had “an acceptable predicate”); see Corinna Sorenson & Michael Drummond, Improving 
Medical Device Regulation: The United States and Europe in Perspective, 92 MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
J. POPULATION HEALTH & HEALTH POL’Y 114, 125 (stating that the FDA intended PMN to 
accelerate the approval of “devices deemed substantially equivalent to devices previously cleared 
by the FDA”); see also Silvestrini, supra note 93 (emphasizing that the PMN pathway allowed 
companies “to fast-track product development without having to go through expensive and time-
consuming testing and clinical trials”). 
95 Premarket Notification 510(k), FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-
submissions/premarket-notification-510k (last updated Mar. 13, 2020). Where the FDA found a 
PMN device was not substantially equivalent to its predicate, the device had to enter the FDA’s 
most stringent approval pathway. Norman, supra note 59 at 280. 
96 Most PMN approvals were Class II devices, but PMN approvals also included some Class I 
and III devices. See Johnson, supra note 61, at 20 (revealing that PNM approvals were more than 
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evidence of [their] safety and effectiveness.”97 As a matter of fact, the FDA 
cleared PMN devices even where their predicate was another PMN device or a 
voluntarily recalled device.98 More disturbingly, 21 CFR § 807.78 clarified that 
PMN clearance did “not in any way denote official approval of . . . [a] device.”99 
Instead, PMN clearance only indicated that the FDA considered the device “no 
less safe and no less effective than a predicate.”100  
Various experts feared that the FDA used PMN to clear “too many high-
risk devices.”101 Indeed, ninety-five to ninety-eight percent of marketed devices 
were PMN devices in the United States.102 From 2004 to 2014, the FDA only 
subjected a mere two percent of devices to its most demanding review 
standards.103 Correspondingly, the United States Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) reported that more than twenty percent of Class III devices 
received PMN clearance.104 Furthermore, the FDA gave numerous high-risk 
devices, like implantable products, a Class II classification despite their potential 
danger.105 
Correspondingly, some PMN approvals led to harmful results and device 
withdraws.106 In 2008, DePuy ASR XL Acetabular Cup System (ASR XL), a 
Class III metal-on-metal hip implant device, received PMN approval.107 ASR 
XL’s predicates dated “back more than five decades” over “a total of 95 different 
devices,” and none of the predicates had all of the device’s characteristics.108 
Several of the ASR XL’s metal-on-metal predicates did not closely resemble its 
 
eighty percent Class II devices, around ten percent Class I devices, and less than five percent Class 
III devices between 1996 and 2009). 
97 Sorenson & Drummond, supra note 94. “[O]nly 10% to 15% of [PMN] submissions 
contain[ed] any clinical data.” Id.; see Silvestrini, supra note 93 (stating that PMN did not require 
a device to undergo “clinical trials and testing”); see also Norman, supra note 59, at 280 
(emphasizing that countless years could lapse “between . . . [a] current device . . . and the clinical 
evidence supporting it” because old PMAs could support “a series of similar devices”). Its weak 
evidentiary requisites seem to bolster the argument that PMN did not evaluate whether a “product 
[was] safe or effective;” instead, “it just agree[ed] with the maker’s claim that the device [was] 
similar” to a predicate. Silvestrini, supra note 93.  
98 See Sorenson & Drummond, supra note 94; Silvestrini, supra note 93 (revealing that the 
FDA to accepted PMN predicates that it “never determined . . . [were] safe,” and predicates that it 
knew were defective); see also Brent M. Ardaugh et. al., The 510(k) Ancestry of a Metal-on-Metal 
Hip Implant, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 97, 98 (2013) (explaining that voluntarily recalled devices 
could serve as a predicate “as long as the FDA did not formally remove these devices from the 
market or a court did not find them adulterated or misbranded”). 
99 21 C.F.R. § 807.97. Moreover, the federal rule emphasized that “[a]ny representation that 
create[d] an impression of official approval of a . . . [PMN device] because . . . [it] compl[ied] 
with the . . . [PMN] regulations [was] misleading and constitute[d] misbranding.” Id. 
100 Ardaugh el. at., supra note 98. 
101 Sorenson & Drummond, supra note 94.  
102 Silvestrini, supra note 93. 
103 Sorenson & Drummond, supra note 94. 
104 Id. 
105 Silvestrini, supra note 93. Consequently, the FDA used PMN to clear around four hundred 
implantable devices annually. Id.  
106 Ardaugh el. at., supra note 98. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
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design, and the others “had poor clinical performance.”109 Moreover, these 
predicates were linked to earlier predicates that “were discontinued . . . well 
before” the ASR XL’s “clearance” due to their high reversion rate.110 After 
numerous patient injuries established the ASR XL’s high reversion rate, its 
manufacturer voluntarily withdrew the device.111 Like ASR XL, experts linked 
other PMN devices to patient harms and subsequent recalls.112   
Unfortunately, the 21st Century Cures Act may force the FDA to clear 
more devices without thoroughly examining their safety and efficacy. Title III 
requires the FDA to exempt certain Class I and II devices from premarket 
review.113 Thus, many more Class I and II devices may escape at least some type 
of evaluation. In addition, Title III requires the FDA to approve all device 
applications based on the least burdensome approach.114 Therefore, PMN 
approvals may reference predicates that have weaker safety and efficacy 
evidence. Regulators and stakeholders must consider whether the Title III 
provisions will lower the safety and efficacy of certain Class I and II devices.  
3. Humanitarian Device Exemption (HDE) 
Humanitarian Device Exemption (HDE) was an expedited approval 
pathway that exempted Humanitarian Use Devices (HUDs) from demonstrating a 
“reasonable assurance of effectiveness.”115 Congress intended the HDE “to 
encourage the discovery and use of devices . . . [that could treat or diagnose] 





112 Diana Zuckerman et. al., 17 Medical Device Recalls and the FDA Approval Process 1006, 
1006-09 (2001). From 2005 to 2009, the FDA recalled one hundred fifteen devices. Id. at 1007. 
One hundred thirteen of the devices were Class I recalls, meaning that the recalls represented the 
highest risk based on postmarket complaints and adverse reports. Id. The FDA only used its most 
rigorous approval process to review nineteen percent of the recalls. Id. By contrast, the FDA used 
its less rigorous PMN process to review seventy-one percent of the recalls. Id. at 1008. Thirty-five 
of the total recall devices were cardiovascular devices, yet two-thirds of the devices were PMN 
clearances and only thirty-four percent of the devices were PMA approvals. Id. Furthermore, 
twelve percent of the overall PMN recalls were Class III devices that should have underwent a 
more stringent PMA review. Id. The researchers noted that “[w]hile even the more rigorous PMA 
criteria” was “often scientifically inadequate to ensure patient safety,” its “standards [were] clearly 
superior to . . . [PMN] standards.” Id. at 1009. These findings suggested that the FDA was 
inappropriately allowing too many high-risk devices to receive PMN approval. 
113 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3054, 130 Stat 1033 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  
114 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 3058, § 513, 130 Stat 1033, 1128–29 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. 360).  
115Humanitarian Device Exemption (HDE) Program–Final Guidance, FDA 6 (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/131886/download. A HUD’s small target population likely justified its 
lower evidentiary requirements. Id. Because HUDs targeted rare diseases, manufacturers likely 
struggled to locate an adequate number of clinical trial participants to generate clinically 
significant data. Id. Under the FDA’s most rigorous evidentiary standards, fewer HUDs likely 
would have entered the market because it would have taken an unreasonable amount of time and 
resources for a manufacturer to enroll enough clinical trial participants. Id. Therefore, HUDs 
defensibly required a lower evidentiary standard to safeguard the availability of innovative 
treatment options for rare diseases and conditions. Id. 
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individuals in the United States per year.”116 As a result, the FDA did not require 
HDE applicants to demonstrate “scientific evidence of efficacy.”117 Instead, the 
FDA only required the applicants to establish that their HUD provided a 
“probable [health] benefit” that “outweigh[ed] [its] risk of injury or illness.”118  
Compared to the FDA’s most stringent review criteria, HUDs had a lower 
evidentiary burden because the FDA only assessed their relative safety, but not 
their efficacy.119 Moreover, the FDA could approve HUDs based on clinical, 
 
116 Current Regulations: 21CFR 814 Subpart H: Humanitarian Use Devices, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/industry/humanitarian-use-device-laws-regulations-and-guidances/current-
regulations-21cfr-814-subpart-h-humanitarian-use-devices (last updated Feb. 16, 2018); see Janice 
Hogan, Does the Humanitarian Device Exemption Process Work (And Is It Worth Pursuing)?, 
MED DEVICE ONLINE (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.meddeviceonline.com/doc/does-the-
humanitarian-device-exemption-process-work-and-is-it-worth-pursuing-0001 (stating that 
Congress created the HDE pathway “to encourage the development of and facilitate access to 
devices for . . . rare conditions and diseases” in 1990). In addition to its limited target population 
requirement, the HDE requires that the exemption was necessary to make the HUD commercially 
available, the HUD was not equivalent to a non-exempt device, and the HUD was beneficial 
compared to its risks. Medical Devices; Humanitarian Use Devices Part V, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/science-research/clinical-trials-and-human-subject-protection/medical-
devices-humanitarian-use-devices-part-v (last updated Sept. 15, 2015). The Safe Medical Devices 
Act of 1990 (the SMDA) amended section 520(m) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 
and “authorize[d] the FDA . . . to exempt a HUD from the effectiveness requirements of sections 
514 and 515” of the FDCA. Id.  
117 Norman, supra note 59, at 281. 
118 Id.; see Medical Devices; Humanitarian Use Devices Part V, supra note 116 (stating that 
HDE applications had to demonstrate that “the device w[ould] not expose patients to an 
unreasonable or significant risk of illness or injury” and that its use provided a “probable [health] 
benefit” that “outweigh[ed] the risk of injury or illness . . . , taking into account” other devices and 
alternative treatments); see also Getting a Humanitarian Use Device to Market FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/humanitarian-device-exemption/getting-humanitarian-use-
device-market (last updated Dec. 12, 2019) (explaining that the FDA’s parameters only required 
HDE applicants to provide enough information to allow it to conclude that the HUD “w[ould] not 
expose patients to an unreasonable or significant risk of illness or injury” and that its potential 
health benefits “outweigh[ed] the risk of injury or illness from its use”).  
119 Norman, supra note 59, at 281. The FDA’s most stringent approval criteria required a 
device to demonstrate both safety and effectiveness. See 21 CFR § 860.7 (2015). A device 
demonstrated a reasonable assurance of safety when the FDA determined that its use provided 
“probable [health] benefits” that “outweigh[ed] any probable risks” based on “valid scientific 
evidence.” See 21 CFR § 860.7(d)(1) (2015). The FDA safety required a device’s valid scientific 
evidence to “demonstrate the absence of unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” Id. Separately, a 
device provided a reasonable assurance of effectiveness when the FDA determined that “a 
significant portion of the target population” used the device according to its intended uses, 
warnings, and instructions, and the use provided “clinically significant results” that were “based 
upon valid scientific evidence.” See 21 CFR § 860.7(e)(1) (2015). The valid scientific evidence an 
applicant needed to demonstrate their device’s effectiveness “consist[ed] principally of well-
controlled investigations . . . unless the [FDA] Commissioner authorize[d] reliance upon other 
valid scientific evidence which the Commissioner has determined [was] sufficient.” 21 CFR § 
860.7(e)(2) (2015). In 21 CFR § 860.7(f), the FDA identified “the essentials of a well-controlled 
clinical investigation” that most applicants needed to demonstrate that their device gave a 
reasonable assurance of efficiency, including standard scientific controls against biased data. See 
21 CFR § 860.7(f) (2015).  
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nonclinical, or experiential evidence that lacked traditional, scientific rigor.120 
However, HUD approvals were not necessarily an effortless endeavor. Although 
“HDEs [were] exempt from the effectiveness requirement[,]” HDE applicants still 
had to provide “all the other information” that the FDA required on PMA 
applications.121 As a result, HDEs “virtually always require[d]” HUDs to have 
“clinical data of some kind” to demonstrate their “safety and probable benefit.”122 
Nevertheless, the 21st Century Cures Act may eliminate the few 
evidentiary hurdles HUDs must satisfy. Title III requires FDA approval of all 
device applications, including HDEs, based on the least burdensome approach.123 
As a result, the FDA could permit HUDs to submit even weaker evidence of their 
reasonable safety. Regulators and stakeholders must consider whether the Title III 
provisions will adversely impact the safety of HUDs and the welfare of patients.  
4. Premarket Approval (PMA) Pathway 
Premarket Approval (PMA) was “the most stringent type of device 
marketing application,” and the FDA used it to “evaluate the safety and 
effectiveness of Class III medical devices.”124 The FDA required PMAs to contain 
enough “valid scientific evidence” to provide a “reasonable assurance that [a] 
device [was] safe and effective.”125  
Before its approval, a PMA device underwent preclinical testing to 
establish its basic safety and efficacy.126 After preclinical testing, a PMA device 
 
120 Medical Devices; Humanitarian Use Devices Part V, supra note 116. The FDA 
acknowledged that HUDs were unique due to their small target population, and it exercised its 
discretion to exclude HUDs from the valid evidence requirements of 21 CFR § 860.7. Id. 
However, the FDA encouraged the HDE applicants to use valid scientific evidence “whenever 
possible,” and it clarified that it could require an HDE applicant to perform clinical testing 
occasionally if it was necessary to demonstrate the HUD was beneficial. Id. Moreover, the FDA 
tightly controlled the commercial distribution of approved HUDs. Norman, supra note 59, at 281. 
In particular, the FDA confined the market price of HUDs to “fees, . . . research and development 
expenses, and other closely defined costs” to protect against manufacturers profiting “from 
devices with unproven efficacy.” Id. If a manufacturer priced a HUD for more than $250, it had to 
have an “independent certified accountant” identify the additional costs and justify the amounts. 
Id. Furthermore, the FDA only allowed manufacturers to distribute approved HUDs to facilities 
with a local independent review board (IRB) to monitor the clinical use of the device. Id. 
121 Stephen P. Rhodes & Elisa D Harvey, HUDs and HDEs: Common Misconceptions and 
Current Challenges, REG. FOCUS 21 (Jan. 2011), https://www.cardiomedllc.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/HUDs-and-HDEs.pdf; see Medical Devices; Humanitarian Use Devices 
Part V, supra note 116 (explaining that the HDE was comparable to the premarket approval 
(PMA) except the HDE did not require “clinical data” regarding the effectiveness of the device). 
122 Rhodes & Harvey, supra note 121.  
123 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 3058, § 513, 130 Stat 1033, 1128–29 
(2016) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. 360).   
124 Premarket Approval (PMA), FDA (May 16, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-
devices/premarket-submissions/premarket-approval-pma; see Norman, supra note 59, at 278 
(explaining that PMA was “the strictest device marketing application,” and it was “required . . . for 
any new device” that lacked a predicate unless the FDA agreed to reclassify it as a Class I or Class 
II device, otherwise known as a “de novo device”).  
125 21 CFR § 860.7(4)(c)(1) (2015).  
126 Owen Faris, Clinical Trials for Medical Devices: FDA and the IDE Process, CTR. DISEASE 
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH Slide 6, https://www.fda.gov/media/87603/download (last viewed Mar. 5, 
2020). Preclinical trial investigations consisted of bench testing and animal testing. Id. In medical 
devices, bench testing was a process that “tease[d] out mechanical and design flaws in devices,” 
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needed an FDA-approved investigational device exemption (IDE) to enter human 
clinical studies.127 Upon IDE approval, a device often entered an exploratory 
study and a pivotal study.128 First, the device entered a feasibility study to 
establish its “preliminary safety and performance information.”129 Feasibility 
studies required researchers to enroll ten to thirty patients.130 Next, the device 
entered a pivotal study to demonstrate that it was safe and effective for its 
intended use.131 Pivotal studies required researchers to enroll 150-300 patients.132 
Following FDA approval, a PMA device entered a postmarketing study to 
determine its “long-term” safety and efficacy.133   
Nevertheless, medical device clinical investigations were rather lax 
compared to traditional clinical trials.134 In particular, the FDA often approved 
PMA devices “based on a single clinical study”135 that lacked traditional scientific 
 
and it measured a device’s durability “without having to implant the device in a human.” Bench 




127 Norman, supra note 59; see Faris, supra note 126, at Slide 8 (stating that the FDA needed 
to approve an IDE before an applicant used the device in human clinical studies).  
128 John Lehmann, DRUG AND MEDICAL DEVICE CLINICAL TRIALS 101, IMARC (Oct. 19, 
2016), https://www.imarcresearch.com/blog/medical-device-clinical-trials-101.  
129 Brandy Chittester, Medical Device Clinical Trials – How Do They Compare with Drug 
Trials?, GXP LIFELINE (Feb. 14, 2014); see Faris, supra note 126, at Slide 10 (explaining that 
feasibility studies could “support . . . a future pivotal study or . . . answer basic research 
questions[,]” but the FDA did “not intend[] [them] to be the primary support for a marketing 
application”).  
130 Chittester, supra note 129; see Faris, supra note 126, at Slide 10 (stating that feasibility 
studies often involved ten to forty participants, but the sample size was occasionally larger than 
forty participants). Unlike a drug clinical trial where researchers administered the drug to “a small 
number of healthy subjects,” a device clinical trial only used the device in participants who had 
“the disease or condition being studied.” Chittester, supra note 129.  
131 Chittester, supra note 129. The FDA mainly intended pivotal studies to provide the 
“clinical support for a marketing application.” Faris, supra note 126, at Slide 10.  
132 Chittester, supra note 129. The sample size and endpoints of pivotal studies were 
“statistically driven” and “designed to demonstrate a ‘reasonable assurance of safety and 
effectiveness.’” Faris, supra note 126, at Slide 11. 
133 Chittester, supra note 129.  
134 Sorenson & Drummond, supra note 94, at 125–26. Randomized control trials (RCTs) were 
considered the “gold standard of evidence.” Sarata, supra note 34, at 55 n.126. RCTs often placed 
clinical trial participants into different groups randomly. Id. RCTs gave one group the new 
treatment and the other group a current treatment or placebo. Id. The RCT randomization helped 
distribute patient variances “equal[ly] across each group” to better discern the effect of the 
treatment. Id.; see Tom Frieden, Why the ‘gold standard’ of medical research is no longer enough, 
STAT (Aug. 2, 2017). https://www.statnews.com/2017/08/02/randomized-controlled-trials-
medical-research/ (explaining that randomization made the tested groups “virtually identical in 
age, gender, socioeconomic status, and other variables” to reduce bias and confounding variables). 
Moreover, RCTs used clinically meaningful endpoints that were measured against an “actual 
patient benefit.” Sarata, supra note 34, at 55 n.126. 
135 Sorenson & Drummond, supra note 94, at 126; see Faris, supra note 126, at Slide 9, 11. 
(stating that pivotal trials provided PMA evidence, and medical device researchers often 
performed a “single pivotal trial”).  
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rigor.136 In particular, device studies frequently used small sample sizes137 
because the FDA only required a device to reasonably assure it was safe and 
effective.138 Furthermore, clinical testing often lacked standard controls and 
procedural uniformity.139 Most clinical trials were not “randomized or blinded” 
studies that used “an active control group and hard end points.”140 Moreover, 
many studies lacked homogeneity “in the way they account[ed] for patients . . . 
and data,” making it difficult to compare the safety and efficacy of different 
devices.141  
Understandably, medical devices had weaker standards because traditional 
standards were less practicable for most Class III devices.142 Class III devices 
included implantable devices, such as pacemakers and breast implants,143 that 
made conventional requirements problematic due to “the risk of the implantation 
or procedure itself.”144 Thus, medical device researchers struggled to randomize 
studies because it was “often unethical” to “give[] [patients] a placebo, or ‘sham’ 
operation.”145 Similarly, researchers had difficulty using “‘blind’ or ‘double blind’ 
 
136 Sorenson & Drummond, supra note 94, at 126.  
137 Large sample sizes are required to apply a higher confidence level to the accuracy of 
clinical trial data. See Sarah Littler, The Importance and Effect of Sample Size, SELECT 
STATISTICAL SERVICES, https://select-statistics.co.uk/blog/importance-effect-sample-size/ (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2020) (explaining that a large sample size increases the confidence level of the 
data, decreases uncertainty, increases “precision,” and increases the ability of a researcher to make 
meaningful inferences); see also Chittester, supra note 129 (stating that device clinical trials 
typically required a small sample size compared to drug clinical trials because the FDA applied a 
lower safety and efficacy standard to devices).  
138 Owen Faris & Jeffery Shuren, An FDA Viewpoint on Unique Considerations for Medical-
Device Clinical Trials, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1350, 1352 (2017). Unlike new drugs where an 
applicant had to provide “‘substantial evidence’” of the drug’s effectiveness, new device 
applicants merely had to provide a reasonable assurance of the device’s safety and effectiveness. 
Hines et. al, supra note 83, at 2. As a result, new drugs often required “two or more well-
controlled clinical studies,” while new devices often only required a single study. Id. 
139 See Faris, supra note 126, at Slide 9 (stating that medical device trials often lacked 
blinding, randomization, controls, and uniform endpoints). 
140 Sorenson & Drummond, supra note 94, at 126; see Hines et. al, supra note 83, at 2 
(discussing how the FDA refused to issue new drug approvals where the drug’s effectiveness was 
solely based on “uncontrolled studies or partially controlled studies,” but it agreed to issue PMA 
approvals where a device’s effectiveness “reli[ed] upon other valid scientific evidence . . . even in 
the absence of well-controlled investigations”) (citing 21 CFR § 314.126(e) and 21 CFR § 
860.7(e)(2)).  
141 Sorenson & Drummond, supra note 94, at 126. 
142 Id. 
143 Are Medical Device Manufacturers Risking Your Safety?, supra note 79.  
144 Faris & Shuren, supra note 138, at 1351.  
145 Chittester, supra note 129; see Faris & Shuren, supra note 138, at 1352 (stating that in 
certain instances it was “difficult or even unethical to randomly assign participants” to treatment 
groups that did not receive the new device). 
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controls”146 because it was “nearly impossible to blind subjects or investigators” 
to the assigned treatment.147  
However, several experts asserted that the PMA pathway had a major 
loophole that provided PMA approvals much like the controversial PMN 
pathway.148 Following an original PMA approval, the FDA could approve 
multiple PMA supplement applications.149 PMA supplement approvals allowed 
manufacturers to make substantial postmarket changes to PMA devices.150 Most 
of the “PMA supplement review tracks” required no more than preclinical or 
weak clinical trial data.151 As a result, “cumulative iterations of device changes” 
allowed PMA devices to “‘drift’ away from the originally approved device.”152 
By 2014, the FDA had approved seventy PMA orthopedic devices.153 However, 
the FDA also approved “[a] total of 765 postmarket changes . . . for these 70 
devices[,]” and most of the approvals only required preclinical or limited clinical 
trial evidence.154 Unsurprisingly, the seventy devices were linked to twelve FDA 
recalls, meaning almost 20% of the modified devices were defective.155 The 
 
146 Chittester, supra note 129. A blind control made clinical trial participants “unaware” of 
whether their treatment was a new product, current product, or a placebo. Id. A double blind 
control made clinical trial participants and the treating physician unaware of whether the 
participant was receiving a new product, current product, or a placebo. Id.  
147 Id.; see Faris & Shuren, supra note 138, at 1351 (stating that occasionally it was 
“infeasible to conduct a blinded trial of an implantable device because it [was] impractical or 
unethical to use a sham control for the target patient population”). 
148 Samuel et. al., How do Orthopaedic Devices Change After Their Initial FDA Premarket 
Approval?, 474 CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS RELATED RES. 1053, 1054–55 (2015); see Rome et. al., 
supra note 83, at 489 (stating that the PMA process “raised concerns about whether physicians 
and patients should sometimes be more wary about” the safety and efficacy of PMA devices). 
149 Samuel et. al., supra note 148. Due to the MDA failing to address the postmarket review 
standards for PMA devices, the FDA created a rule that allowed manufacturers to “supplement the 
design of existing devices.” Rome et. al., supra note 83, at 492. Congress adopted the FDA’s rule 
into the FDA Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997. Id. 
150 Samuel et. al., supra note 148. 
151 Id. Major changes to a device’s design often only required preclinical data “with ‘limited 
confirmatory clinical data’ needed in some cases.” Rome et. al., supra note 83, at 493. Only 
extreme changes, such as label modifications that broadened a device’s use “or remov[ed] 
contraindications[,]” required new clinical evidence. Samuel et. al., supra note 148, at 1055.  
152 Samuel et. al., supra note 148, at 1054. 
153 Id. at 1057.  
154 Id. According to the midpoint, the FDA approved 6.5 postmarket modifications per 
orthopedic device. Id. Some devices featured a higher number or rate of postmarket changes than 
other PMA devices. Id. Over 30.5-year period, the New Jersey LCS® Total Knee System 
incorporated the highest number of postmarket changes. Id. It received “135 device changes . . ., 
or 4.4 device changes per device-year.” Id. The Ceramax ® Ceramic Hip System received highest 
rate of postmarket approvals per year. Id. In a 4.4 period, the FDA approved 4.5 supplement 
applications for the device annually. Id. Like orthopedic devices, “many high-risk cardiac devices 
[were] actually approved as PMA ‘supplements,’ or changes to already-approved device models, 
often without the new use of clinical data to support the altered device design.” Rome et. al., supra 
note 83, at 490. 
155 Samuel et. al., supra note 148, at 1059. 
SPRING 2021 THE 21ST CENTURY CURES ACT: A PATIENT’S MIRACLE OR DEMISE? 
 
100 
various recalls highlight the significance of the FDA’s evidentiary standards and 
caution against the FDA using additional evidentiary shortcuts.156  
Unfortunately, the 21st Century Cures Act may further undermine the 
scientific rigor of the FDA’s PMA process even more. Title III requires the FDA 
to approve all device applications, including PMAs, based on the least 
burdensome approach.157 As a result, the FDA could permit original PMA 
applications to contain weaker evidence of a device’s reasonable safety and 
effectiveness. Regulators and stakeholders must consider whether the Title III 
provisions will eviscerate the PMA process and increase the number of FDA 
device recalls.  
 
B. Pharmaceutical Approval 
1. New Drug Application (NDA) 
In the United States, all new drugs were subject to the “regulation and 
control” of the FDA’s new drug application (NDA)158 before they could enter the 
market.159 An NDA not only required new drugs to demonstrate their safety, but it 
also required them to establish “‘substantial evidence’” of their 
effectiveness.160 The FDA usually required new drugs to undergo “at least two 
adequate and well-controlled studies.” It expected both studies to establish a new 
drug’s effectiveness independently.161 As a result, NDA approvals [were] slow 
 
156 In Riegel v. Medtronic, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s finding that federal 
law barred the plaintiff’s “claims of strict liability; breach of implied warranty; and negligence in 
the design, testing, inspection, distribution, labeling, marketing, and sale of” a defective catheter 
because the “MDA’s pre-emption clause bar[red] common law claims challenging the safety and 
effectiveness” of PMA-approved devices. 552 U.S. 312, 315 (2008); see 21 U.S.C.A. § 360k 
(West) (stating that the MDA preempted state laws that were “different from, or in addition to” its 
provisions if it was “relate[d] to the safety or effectiveness of . . . [a] device or to any other matter 
included” in its provisions). Instead, the Court found that the plaintiff could only bring a common-
law tort claim where the “claim[] [was] premised on a violation of FDA regulations” because “the 
state duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than add to, federal requirements.” Medtronic, 552 U.S. 
at 330 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996)). Therefore, device manufacturers 
receive “immunity . . . against most lawsuits for injuries or deaths resulting from PMA-approved 
devices” where “the manufacturer did not design the device properly or sufficiently warn patients 
about its risks.” Rome et. al., supra note 83, at 490. Because Congress limited a patient’s ability to 
recover damages where a faulty device injured them, the FDA must diligently apply evidentiary 
standards that mitigate patient harm to protect public welfare. 
157 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 3058, § 513, 130 Stat. 1033, 1128–29 
(2016) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. 360). 
158 An NDA “includes all data concerning a drug,” including its manufacturing and quality 
control process. Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 1, 1 JACC: BASIC 
TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 170, 178 (2016). As a result, the average NDA was 100,000 pages. Id. 
159 New Drug Application, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/new-drug-
application-nda (last updated June 10, 2019).  
160 21 CFR § 314.126(a). In 1938, Congress passed the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA), and it required drug manufacturers to demonstrate that their drugs were safe before they 
could market them. Promoting Safe & Effective Drugs for 100 Years, FDA (Apr. 23, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/histories-product-regulation/promoting-safe-effective-drugs-100-
years. In 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments, and it required drug 
manufacturers to provide “‘substantial evidence’” that their drug was effective. Id.  
161 Guidance for Industry Providing Clinical Evidence of Effectiveness for Human Drug and 
Biological Products, FDA 3 (May 1998), https://www.fda.gov/media/71655/download.  
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and costly, and the FDA “face[d] constant, often contradictory pressure to shorten 
the approval process, while still preserving or enhancing the safety and efficacy of 
drugs.”162  
The 21st Century Cures Act pressures the FDA to accelerate and 
streamline its approval process.163 Thus, it is essential to review the FDA’s 
original approval process to understand whether the Act’s provisions will 
compromise the safety and efficacy of new drugs. Before the Act, NDA approval 
required preclinical trials, investigational new drug (IND) approval, and 
meticulous clinical trials.   
i. Preclinical Trials 
Eligible compounds164 underwent preclinical testing to determine their 
suitability for human clinical trials.165 In preclinical trials, researchers 
“conduct[ed] a series of laboratory and animal studies”166 over multiple years to 
evaluate a compound’s “bioactivity, safety, and efficacy.”167 Researchers used 
toxicology168 and bioanalytical169 tests to support a compound’s potential clinical 
trials.170 Simultaneously, researchers designed a compound’s clinical trial and 
prepared its investigational new drug (IND) application.171   
ii. Investigational New Drug (IND) Application 
Under United States federal law, a new drug could not enter human 
clinical trials unless it obtained an investigational new drug (IND) application.172 
 
162 Norman, supra note 158, at 178.  
163 Lieberman, supra note 23. 
164 Before the preclinical trial stage, researchers undertook drug discovery activities to 
“identify potential biological targets for possible future medicines.” 2015 profile 
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 37. Researchers selected and 
investigated a biochemical mechanism in a disease to detect possible targets. Id. Subsequent to 
identifying potential targets, researchers tested “[u]p to 5,000 to 10,000 molecules” for the most 
promising compounds. Pacific BioLabs, Stages of Drug Development, 
https://pacificbiolabs.com/stages-of-drug-development (last viewed Jan. 1, 2020). The testing 
consisted of “rigorous screening” methods that tracked target interactivity and target symptoms to 
isolate eligible compounds. Id. 
165 2015 profile BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 38. 
Preclinical testing “analyzes the bioactivity, safety, and efficacy of the formulated drug product.” 
Pacific BioLabs, supra note 164. “Only a few compounds” pass the preclinical testing phase and 
move onto the clinical trial stage. 2015 profile BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY, 
supra note 47, at 38. 
166 2015 profile BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 38.  
167 Pacific BioLabs, supra note 164. 
168 Id. Preclinical toxicology tests “assess[ed] the onset, severity, and duration of toxic effects, 
their dose dependency and degree of reversibility (or irreversibility).” Pacific BioLabs, In Vivo 
Toxicology: Toxicology Studies, https://pacificbiolabs.com/in-vivo-toxicology (last viewed Jan. 
26, 2021).  
169 Pacific BioLabs, supra note 164. Bioanalytical tests helped researchers evaluate the 
chemical and biochemical properties of a compound throughout its development. Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Investigational New Drug (IND) or Device Exemption (IDE) Process (CBER), FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/development-approval-process-
cber/investigational-new-drug-ind-or-device-exemption-ide-process-cber (last updated May 14, 
2019).  
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IND applications requested information about (1) preclinical studies and prior 
human use;173 (2) drug production; and (3) clinical trial requirements. Once an 
IND was valid,174 the drug could enter clinical trials “to demonstrate [its] safety 
and efficacy” in humans.175 The NDA clinical trials comprised three phases, and 
the FDA required a drug to “successfully complete each phase.”176 
iii. Clinical Trials 
In Phase I, researchers administered the new drug to a small group of 
healthy participants to examine its safety in humans.177 Researchers conducted 
single dose,178 single ascending dose,179 and multiple ascending dose180 trials to 
determine the drug’s dosing, side effects, and toxicity.181 Phase II studies 
evaluated a drug’s effectiveness, and it continued investigating its safety.182 The 
studies enrolled one hundred to three hundred patients,183 and the experiments 
typically used a placebo treatment group.184 Researchers used Phase III studies to 
generate “statistically significant” evidence that a drug was safe and effective.185 
The studies enrolled one thousand to three thousand patients, and the tests often 
 
173 Norman, supra note 158, at 172. 
174 See IND Application Procedures: Overview, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/ 
investigational-new-drug-ind-application/ind-application-procedures-overview (last updated Oct. 
9, 2015) (stating that “[a]n IND application [may go] into effect: 30 days after FDA receives the 
application, unless FDA notifies the sponsor that the investigations described in the application are 
subject to a Clinical Hold; or on earlier notification by FDA that the clinical investigations in the 
IND may begin”).  
175 2015 profile BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 38.  
176 Id. at 39.  
177 Norman, supra note 158, at 176; see 2015 profile BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH 
INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 39 (explaining that researchers administered a new drug to twenty to 
eighty participants “to determine the safety of the compound and how it is best metabolized or 
processed in the body”). 
178 Norman, supra note 158, at 176. Participants received a single dose of a drug, and the dose 
was one-tenth or less of the drug’s highest preclinical trial dose that lacked adverse effects. Id. If 
the participants experienced a “severe reaction,” the researchers stopped the drug’s clinical trial. 
Id. 
179 Id. In single ascending dose studies, approximately three participants received a higher 
single dose than the initial single dose study. Id. The researchers increase the single dosing across 
small groups of participants “until either pre-calculated pharmacokinetic safety levels are reached 
or until adverse effect begin appearing.” Id. Where unreasonable side effects were present, the 
dose that preceded the side effects was the drug’s “maximum tolerated dose.” Id. 
180 Id. In multiple ascending dose studies, participants received “multiple low doses of the 
drug, and biological samples (blood, fluids, urine) [were] collected and analyzed.” Id.  
181 Id. at 175. 
182 Id. at 176; see 2015 profile BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY, supra note 
47, at 39 (stating that Phase II studies mainly addressed a drug’s safety, but they also “determine 
[its] effectiveness . . . and optimal dosing”).  
183 2015 profile BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 39. 
Unlike Phase I, Phase II and III administered the drug to its target population. Id. 
184 Norman, supra note 158, at 176. 
185 2015 profile BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY, supra note 47, at 39.  
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used alternative treatment groups.186 Where a drug’s results demonstrated its 
safety and effectiveness, it could obtain an NDA approval.187  
2. Clinical Trial Misconduct & Fraud  
Because Title III introduces less rigorous evidentiary standards, it may 
make drug clinical trials more vulnerable to manipulation. Thus, it is important to 
discuss clinical trial misconduct and fraud. Historically, some principal 
investigators committed “scientific misconduct or fraud” to evade the rigors of the 
clinical trial process.188 From 1977 to 2012, publishers retracted over two 
thousand scientific publications, and most of the retractions were biomedical 
publications that involved fraudulent data.189 Two exemplary cases involved Dr. 
Robert Fiddes and Dr. Scott Rueben.  
In the 1990’s, Dr. Robert Fiddes, the former director of the Southern 
California Research Institute, oversaw multiple clinical trials to secure NDA 
approvals.190 Unfortunately, Dr. Fiddes committed “scientific fraud on an 
impressive scale for over a decade” to produce his clinical trial data.191 
Specifically, Dr. Fiddes’s clinical trials included unqualified, fabricated, and 
coerced patients.192 Moreover, Dr. Fiddes manipulated clinical data and falsified 
“blood pressure [data], EKG[] [values], and other results.”193 In fact, Dr. Fiddes 
used blood and urine samples that did not belong to enrolled participants.194 
Eventually, Susan Lester, one of Dr. Fiddes’s study coordinators, reported his 
misconduct to the FDA.195 In 1997, a court convicted Dr. Fiddes of fraud, and he 
received a 15-month prison sentence.196  
 
186 Norman, supra note 158, at 176; see Chittester, supra note 129 (stating that new drug 
clinical trials often were randomized, had blind controls, used large populations, included 
placebos, and compared “the new product to current therapies”).  
187 Norman, supra note 158, at 176 
188 See Stephen L. George & Marc Buyse, Data fraud in clinical trials, 5 CLINICAL 
INVESTIGATION 161, 161 (2015) (stating that “[h]ighly publicized cases of fabrication or 
falsification of data in clinical trials had] occurred in recent years, and it [was] likely that there 
[was] additional undetected or unreported cases”). Clinical data fraud included “selective reporting 
. . . failure to follow written protocol, emphasis on secondary rather than primary outcomes, use of 
improper statistical methods, failure to publish [clinical trial results] and so on.” Id.  
189 Id. at 163.  
190 Id. at 164.  
191 Id.; see FR DATE: 11/06/2002, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-
enforcement-and-criminal-investigations/fda-debarment-list-drug-product-applications/fr-date-
11062002 (last updated Aug. 19, 2014) (stating that Dr. Fiddes “direct[ed], and encourage[ed] the 
submission of false information to sponsors in required reports for clinical studies used by FDA to 
evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drug products”). 
192 George & Buyse, supra note 188, at 164.  
193 Id. 
194 Id. Dr. Fiddes paid one of his employees $25 per urine sample and used it in his clinical 
trial “as if it were a sample from an actual patient.” Id.  
195 Drug Trial Dangers?, CBSNEWS (Mar. 30, 2001), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/drug-
trial-dangers.  
196 George & Buyse, supra note 188, at 164.; see FR DATE: 11/06/2002, supra note 191 
(stating that the FDA was “debarring Dr. Robert A. Fiddes for 20 years from providing services in 
any capacity to a person that has an approved or pending drug product application” due to his 
fraud conviction).  
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Similarly, Scott Reuben, the former Professor of Anesthesiology at 
Baystate Medical Center,197 falsified clinical data relating to “post-operative 
multimodal analgesia therapy.”198 Dr. Reuben entered contracts to manage 
multiple clinical trials, and he “published articles in various medical journals 
based on the purported results of the research.”199 In 2000, Dr. Reuben claimed 
that the combination of “COX2 inhibitors, such as Vioxx, Celebrex, and Pfizer's 
Bextra (valdecoxib)” and certain nerve pain relievers aided the recovery of 
orthopedic surgery patients.200 Some experts estimate that his purported research 
“led to the sale of billions of dollars[’] worth of the potentially dangerous 
drugs.”201 Unfortunately, Dr. Reuben fabricated the research results, and his 
suggested drug use likely stalled patient recovery and increased their risk of a 
cardiac event.202 In 2016, the FDA “permanently debarr[ed] [Dr. Reuben] from 
providing services in any capacity to a person with an approved or pending drug 
product application.”203 
Title III allows the FDA to issue NDA approvals based on less rigorous 
evidence, such as surrogate markers and real-world evidence. Arguably, the Act’s 
less stringent evidentiary criteria will increase a research investigator’s ability to 
submit biased and misleading clinical trial data. Regulators and stakeholders must 
ensure that Title III does not increase clinical data fraud to protect vulnerable 
patients.  
 
V. HOW THE ACT IS CHANGING DRUG & MEDICAL DEVICE 
DEVELOPMENT  
Division A’s Title III provisions change the clinical data standards that 
pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers must satisfy to accelerate the 
FDA approval process.204 In drug clinical trials, Title III allows researchers to use 
surrogate markers and real-world evidence.205 Separately, Title III requires the 
 
197 Paul F. White et. al., The Scott Reuben Saga One Last Retraction, 112 ANESTHESIA & 
ANALGESIA 512, 512 (2011). 
198 Scott Reuben Notice, 76 FEDERAL REGISTER 7102, 7103 (2011). 
199 Id. Dr. Reuben published at least twenty-one articles that “were pure fiction.” Brendan 
Borrell, A Medical Madoff: Anesthesiologist Faked Data in 21 Studies, SCI. AM. (Mar. 10, 2009), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-medical-madoff-anesthestesiologist-faked-data/.  
200 Borrell, supra note 199.  
201 Id.  
202 Id. 
203 Scott Reuben Notice, supra note 198. According to preclinical animal studies, COX2 
inhibitors possibly impeded bone regeneration. Borrell, supra note 199. In 2004, Vioxx and Bextra 
were discontinued because they increased a patient’s risk of having a cardiac event or stroke. Id. 
Another study indicated that Celebrex also increased a patient’s risk of having a cardiac event. Id. 
204 Gaybay, supra note 8; see Sarata, supra note 34, at summary (stating that Division A, Title 
III “modif[ies] the drug and device approval pathways”). 
205 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114–255, sec. 3011, § 507, 130 Stat 1033, 1186–91 
(2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 357); 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114–255, sec. 
3022, § 505F, 130 Stat. 1033, 1196–98 (2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 355(g)); see 
Barlas, supra note 8 (stating that the legislation “forc[es] the FDA to permit pharmaceutical 
companies to gain approval of new indications for existing drugs with evidence assembled short of 
expensive clinical trials and short of conventional ‘endpoints’”); see also Gaybay, supra note 8 
(acknowledging that Title III “discusses the use of biomarkers, surrogate measures, patient 
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FDA to exempt certain Class I and II devices from premarket review.206 Title III 
also expands the FDA’s obligation to approve devices based on the least 
burdensome approach.207 Some experts believe that Title III provides a less 
rigorous data standard that will erode the reliability and safety of FDA approved 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices.208 
 
A. Increasing Drug Development Laxity  
1. Permitting Use of Surrogate Markers  
Title III, Subtitle B § 3011 “is perhaps the most controversial provision” 
of the 21st Century Cures Act because it endorses “certain evidence types . . . that 
call into question” the reliability of data for new drug approvals.209 In particular, 
Subtitle B authorizes manufacturers to use drug development tools to “support[] 
or obtain[] approval or licensure . . . of a drug” or to “support[] the investigational 
use of a drug.”210  
Subtitle B specifies that a drug development tool “includes–(A) a 
biomarker; (B) a clinical outcome assessment; and (C) any other method, 
material, or measure that . . . aids drug development and regulatory review.”211 
Because surrogate endpoints are a common biomarker,212 it can help explain the 
potential risks of drug development tools. 
Unlike traditional clinical endpoints, “favorable effects on surrogate[] 
[endpoints] do not automatically translate into benefits to health.”213 As a result, 
 
experience information, and observational data” based on “routine clinical use or ‘real world 
evidence’”).  
206 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 3054, § 510, 130 Stat. 1033, 1126–27 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. 360). 
207 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 3058, § 515, 130 Stat. 1033, 1128–29 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. 360).  
208 Barlas, supra note 8; see also Gaybay, supra note 8 (last viewed Oct. 21, 2019) (stating 
that healthcare professionals are concerned that Title III will weaken the merits of clinical trial 
data). 
209 Goble, supra note 1, at 678. 
210 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 3011(b)(2)(A), § 507, 130 Stat. 1033, 
1087 (2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 357).  
211 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 3011€(5), § 507, 130 Stat. 1033, 1089 
(2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 357). The Act defines a biomarker as “a characteristic 
(such as a physiologic, pathologic, or anatomic characteristic or measurement) that is objectively 
measured and evaluated as an indicator of normal biologic processes, pathologic processes, or 
biological responses to a therapeutic intervention.” Id. The Act notes that surrogate endpoints are a 
type of biomarker. Id. 
212 Infra note 219. A surrogate endpoint is “a marker, such as a laboratory measurement, 
radiographic image, physical sign, or other measure, that is not itself a direct measurement of a 
clinical benefit.” 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 3011(e)(9), § 507, 130 Stat 
1033, 1089 (2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 357). Surrogate endpoints are attractive 
“proxies for hard clinical trial outcomes” because they “enable smaller, faster, and thus cheaper 
clinical trials.” David Menkes, Surrogate Outcomes in Clinical Trials: A Cautionary Tale, 173 J. 
AM. MED. ASS. INTERNAL MED. 611, 611 (2013). 
213 Menkes, supra note 212. From 2008 to 2012, the FDA approved thirty-six of fifty-four 
new cancer drugs “on the basis of surrogate markers.” Kaplan, supra note 22. Most of the 
surrogate markers measured a drug’s ability to shrink tumors. Id. However, a study revealed that 
50% of the drugs provided “no evidence of improved life expectancy.” Id. Because 36% of the 
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some experts are concerned that Title III’s endorsement of drug development 
tools will cause the FDA to “mov[e] away from requiring drug manufacturers to 
prove that a drug actually benefits a patient.”214 
In the past, the FDA admitted that surrogate endpoints do not provide 
“reliable evidence” due to their inconsistent results.215 One study reported that 
“65% of potential drug targets or biomarkers have inconsistencies when 
attempting to reproduce findings.”216 Moreover, some surrogate endpoints “have 
proven to be poor or misleading” once the drug entered the market.217 
Correspondingly, another study exposed the potential harms of surrogate 
endpoints, and it referenced fourteen instances where surrogate drug approvals 
injured patients.218  
Recently, surrogate endpoints have become “commonplace,” and they 
were “the primary endpoint in clinical trials for 45% of new drugs approved 
between 2010 and 2012.”219 However, many healthcare professionals believe that 
clinical trials should only use surrogate markers in a limited number of 
circumstances220 because “growing evidence” suggests that a researcher’s sole 
“rel[iance] on surrogate trials . . . is, in most circumstances, fundamentally 
flawed.”221  
2. Permitting Use of "Real-world" Evidence  
Like surrogate endpoints in Subtitle B, real-world evidence is another 
“contentious” provision.222 Title III, Subtitle C § 3022 permits pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to “submit real-world evidence . . . instead of randomized control 
trial . . . data to seek new indications for existing medications.”223  
 
drugs lacked any survival data, it was possible that the study underreported the percentage of 
drugs that produced no discernable health benefit. Id. Not only did many of the drugs fail to 
demonstrate a health benefit, but two of the drugs “actually made [a patient’s] quality of life 
worse.” Id. Yet, one of the drugs that “reduce[d] quality of life and d[id] not increase life 
expectancy [was] sold for approximately $170,000 per person per year.” Id.  
214 Barlas, supra note 8.  
215 Goble, supra note 1, at 678. In an oncology meta-analysis, a study reported “that the 
correlation between surrogate markers and overall survival was low in 52% of the studies, medium 
in 25%, and high in only 23%.” Id. 
216 Id.  
217 Id. The FDA approved cyclic adenosine, a heart drug, based on surrogate markers. 
Subsequently, studies discovered that the drug increased mortality up to 28%. Similarly, three 
other surrogate-approved drugs were “later found to increase mortality.” Menkes, supra note 212. 
218 Goble, supra note 1, at 678.  
219 Id.  
220 Some exerts purport that “surrogate endpoints in clinical studies may be advantageous 
when clinical outcomes are difficult to collect or take an unreasonable time to capture.” Id. 
221 Menkes, supra note 212, at 612.  
222 Goble, supra note 1, at 679.  
223 Id.; see Vernessa T. Pollard et. al., FDA Issues Real-World Evidence Framework for Drugs 
and Biologics, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.mwe.com/insights/fda-
issues-real-world-evidence-framework-for-drugs-and-biologics/ (explaining that Title III, Subtitle 
C § 3022 “added §505F (21 USC 355g) to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 
requiring [the] FDA to establish a program to evaluate the potential use of evidence from clinical 
experience to help (1) support the approval of a new indication for a drug already approved under 
section 505(c) (21 USC § 355(c)) of the FDCA or (2) support or satisfy drug post-approval study 
requirements”).  
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Title III describes real-world evidence as any “data regarding the usage, or 
the potential benefits or risks, of a drug derived from sources other than 
randomized clinical trials.”224 The provisions specifically accept real-world 
evidence that “includ[es] ongoing safety surveillance, observational studies, 
registries, claims, and patient-centered outcomes research activities.”225  
Experts have raised concerns about clinical trials using real-world 
evidence due to “the relatively large number of assumptions necessary to analyze 
nonrandomized observational data.”226 The main disadvantage of real-world 
evidence is that it is subject to selection bias.227 Moreover, real-world evidence 
often will produce “information gaps” that decrease its quality and usefulness as 
clinical trial data.228 As a matter of fact, real-world evidence can overestimate a 
drug’s benefits where the principal researcher does not implement controls against 
spurious correlations.229 
 
B. Increasing Device Development Laxity   
1. Exempting Certain Class I and II Devices  
Title III, Subtitle F § 3054 requires the FDA to establish a list of Class I 
devices that “no longer” need PMN review within “120 calendar days” of the 
Act’s passage and “at least once every 5 years thereafter.”230 Similarly, the 
provision requires the FDA to establish a list of Class II devices that “no longer” 
need PMN review within “90 days” of the Act’s passage and “at least once every 
5 years thereafter.”231 As a result, the FDA exempted “more than 70 Class I 
device types and more than 1,000 Class II device types” from PMN review as of 
2017.232  
Some experts warn that the exemption initiative may increase patient 
harms because it lowers the approval standards of products that “[a]lready . . . 
[had] lax regulation.”233 Regulators and stakeholders must understand that § 3054 
 
224 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3022(b), § 505 F, 130 Stat 1033, 1096 
(2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 355(g)).  
225 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 3022(c)(2)(A), § 505 F, 130 Stat 1033, 
1096 (2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.). Some experts believe that clinical trials are the 
“gold standard” for medical research, and an alternative standard could be “a step in the wrong 
direction.” Barlas, supra note 8 (quoting Sanket Dhruva, “a cardiologist and . . . researcher at the 
Yale School of Medicine”).  
226 Goble, supra note 1, at 679.  
227 Id. Selection bias occurs where the principal researcher selects study participants that are 
not representative of the target population, leading to bias and unreliable data. Wayne W. 
LaMorfe, Selection Bias, B.U. PUB. HEALTH, http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt 
/MPH-Modules/EP/EP713_Bias/EP713_Bias2.html (last updated June 19, 2020). 
228 Goble, supra note 1, at 679.  
229 Id.  
230 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114–255, sec. 3054(a)(2), § 510(l), 130 Stat. 1033, 
1126 (2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 360(m)).  
231 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114–255, sec. 3054(b)(1)(A)-(b)(1)(A)(ii), § 510(l), 
130 Stat. 1033, 1126 (2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 360(m)).  
232 Gottlieb, supra note 58.  
233 Rachel Solnick, The 21st Century Cures Act: Big Pharma Handout or Drug Development 
Boon?, EM RESIDENT (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.emra.org/emresident/article/the-21st-century-
cures-act-big-pharma-handout-or-drug-development-boon/. According to former United States 
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may lead to patient harms because it increases the number of commercially 
available devices that lack evidence of their safety and effectiveness.  
2. Least Burdensome Device Review  
Before Title III, the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act 
(FDAMA) of 1997 required the FDA to “consider the least burdensome 
appropriate means necessary to demonstrate a reasonable assurance of device 
safety and effectiveness.”234 Congress intended the least burdensome provisions 
to “eliminate[] unnecessary burdens that may delay the marketing of beneficial 
new products.”235 Nevertheless, research sponsors alleged that the FDA failed to 
dutifully implement the least burdensome provisions into its approval process.236 
In response, Title III requires the FDA to more “accurately reflect Congress’ 
intent” regarding the FDAMA’s least burdensome provisions.237  
Title III, Subtitle F § 3058 requires “each employee of the . . . [FDA] who 
is involved in the review of premarket submissions . . . [to] receive[] training” on 
“the meaning and implementation of the least burdensome requirements.”238 
Furthermore, it requires the FDA to periodically evaluate its use of the least 
burdensome principles to ensure that the agency is “[m]ore consistent[ly] and 
meaningful[ly] appl[ying]” them.239 
Under Title III, the FDA has interpreted the least burdensome standard to 
require “the minimum amount of information necessary to adequately address a 
relevant regulatory question or issue through the most efficient manner at the right 
time.”240 As a result, the FDA permits PMA devices to submit “[a]lternative 
sources of clinical data[,]” such as “peer-reviewed literature, outside the U.S. 
(OUS) data, real-world evidence (RWE), . . . well-documented case histories[,]” 
and nonclinical evidence.241  
 
Representative Mike Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania, he “‘voted against the . . . [21st Century Cures 
Act] because it fail[ed] to protect patients against dangerous medical devices.” Llamas, supra note 
27. See also Congressman Mike Fitzpatrick: Medical device bill fails to protect patients, BUCKS 
LOCAL NEWS (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.buckslocalnews.com/news/congressman-mike-
fitzpatrick-medical-device-bill-fails-to-protect-patients/article_0ca589f0-55aa-5932-b584-
b447257b9420.html.  
234 The Least Burdensome Provisions: Concept and Principles: Guidance for Industry and 
Food and Drug Administration Staff, FDA 5 (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/73188/download.  
235 Id. at 4.  
236 See Sarah Faulkner, How the 21st Century Cures Act will affect medical devices, +MASS 
DEVICE (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.massdevice.com/21st-century-cures-act-will-affect-medical-
devices/ (stating that “[t]he medical device industry has long held the position that . . . the [FDA] 
d[id] not comply with the requirement to determine the ‘least burdensome means’ of establishing 
substantial equivalence or effectiveness of a device”).  
237 The Least Burdensome Provisions: Concept and Principles: Guidance for Industry and 
Food and Drug Administration Staff, supra note 234, at 4.  
238 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, sec. 3058(a)(j)(1)(A), § 513 130 Stat. 1033, 
1128 (2016) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 360(c)). 
239 Proposed FDA Work Plan for 21st Century Cures Act Innovation Account Activities, FDA 
11, https://www.fda.gov/files/Proposed-FDA-Work-Plan-for-21st-Century-Cures-Act-Innovation-
Account-Activities-as-Submitted-to-Science-Board.pdf (last viewed Mar. 5, 2020).  
240 The Least Burdensome Provisions, supra note 234, at 4. 
241 Id. at 10–12.  
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Because Title III reduces the rigors of the FDA’s most stringent review 
standards, it will allow high-risk devices to use weaker evidence to demonstrate 
their reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness. It is essential that Title III 




Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act to increase the number of cures 
available to patients. However, Title III may deleteriously alter the evidentiary 
standards of drug and device approvals. For new drugs, Title III permits surrogate 
endpoints and real-world evidence in lieu of more rigorous scientific data. For 
new medical devices, Title III requires the FDA to exempt certain Class I and II 
devices from any kind of safety or efficacy evaluation. Moreover, Title III forces 
the FDA to use the least burdensome review standards across all device 
applications.  
Although the 21st Century Cures Act may deliver benefits, potentially grave 
harms may offset its advantages. As a result, regulators and stakeholders must 
vigilantly monitor the Title III developments and safeguard the wellbeing of 
patients. 
 
